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UNITED STATES 
v. 
FRIDAY, et al (Ag Extension 
Service officials accused of 
discrimination) 
No. 85-93 - c.F)< 
BAZEMORE, et al (black ag 
extension service employees) 
v. 
FRIDAY, et al (Ag Extension 
Service officials accused of 
discrimination) 
, 
, 
Cert to CA4 (Widener, Kellam [sd~): 
diss. by Phillips) 
Federal/CivilTimely (with 
extension) 
Cert to CA4 (~idener, Kellam rsdj]: 
diss. by Phillips) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: Petrs challenge rulings by the de, affirmed by r.A4 1) 
-, 
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~ that differentials between wages paid to white and black employees 
/ 
of the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service (NCAES) did not 
constitute employment discrimination~ 2) that maintenance of local 
4-H clubs that are voluntarily segregated does not violate the ~itle 
VI prohibition against discrimination in programs receiving federal 
aid; and 3) that the NCAES did not discriminate against blacks in 
selecting county extension chairmen. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: The NCAES provides informational 
services to North Carolina farmers. It is funded jointly through 
the u.s. Department of Agriculture, the State of North Carolina, and 
the counties in which each office is located. Until 1965, the NCAES 
was strictly segregated, with a white branch staffed by white 
employees serving white farmers and a black branch staffed by black 
employees serving black farmers. Although black ag extension agents 
had identical job titles and responsibilities as their white 
counterparts, the salaries of black employees were kept lower than 
their white counterparts. 
The black and white branches of NCAES were merged on August 1, 
1965. From that date onward, new b1ack and white employees were 
paid the same initial salaries. However, salary disparities as to 
pre-1965 hired black employees remained in effect, and these 
employees were still receiving less than their white counterparts 
when Title VII became applicable to public employees in 1972. 
Since each NCAES employee's salary is paid in part by the three 
different entities that fund the service (feds, state, and county), 
each employee's salary increases also depend on the varying 
increases in funding for a particular position. Some counties 
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pro,·icie merit pav increases ~·hile ot"'e.rs qrant across the ~a~d 
raises. ~t the same time, the state may 9rovide a different amount 
of increase in a different form. Because o~ these different fun~ing 
sources, salaries for identical positions tend to varv wide.i.v fr~m 
county to county. 
The county extension chairman is in charge of coordinating the 
extension program in each count~·. t''hen the posi tio:1 \oo'as created in 
1Q65, chairmen were selected from among the extension aqents of each 
county. Only white agents were selected to fill the ini~ial 
positions. As \'acancies have occurred since 1QI2, they ha\·e been 
announced publicly . Applicants are then interviewed by service 
officials, \\•ho make recornrnendat ions to the board of county 
commissioners. The board of county commissioners makes the final 
selection from arnonq the candidates so recommended. ~ew blac~ 
applicants have been selected as county chairmen, and none has been 
selected in preference to a white male applicant . 
Prior to 1965, the NCAES had established separate all-white and 
all-black 4-H and extension homemaker clubs. After 196~, the NC~F.g 
requested a formal assurance from each such club that it would n~t 
discriminate on the ba~is of race. Nevertheless, there remain , 4S 
all white clubs, compared to the 1,474 all-white clubs existing in 
1965 before any reme~ial action was taken. Separate black and white 
4-H and Extension Homemakers clubs exist in racially integrateJ 
communities. 
The individual petrs filed this suit in 1971, alleqing that 
NCAES was guilty of discriminatory practices in violati,n f the 
14th amendment and titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act f 
-
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less than one in three-thousand. Resps' expert testimony was based 
on a survey that added the factor of employee performance rating to 
the racially neutral factors considered. Resps also criticizen 
petrs' survey, however, for failure to take account of such factors 
as the differentials among merit and cost of living raises in 
different counties. The de found that resp had effectively rebutted 
petrs' prima facie case of race discrimination, even if the 
statistical evidence were sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case. The de accepted as valid resps' explanation that the pre-1965 
wage disparities could not be cured immediately. 
Petrs also presented evidence that of 123 county chairman 
appointments since 1965, only six appointments had gone to blacks. 
The ~c relied upon the fact that there were black applications for 
only 18 of the county chairman positions becoming vacant since 1972, 
when open applications were begun, and that the appointment of 
blacks to six of these eighteen slots showed evidence of 
discrimination to be insubstantial. 
The de considered the evidence of individual discrimination 
presented by each of the 38 named employment discrimination 
plaintiffs. In each case, the de found that the plaintiff had 
failed to prove that he had suffered discrimination in either wages 
or promotion. 
The dq also rejected petrs claims based upon discrimination in 
membership of 4-H clubs, reasoning that membership in all such clubs 
was voluntary, and that there was no evidence that anyone had sought 
and been denied membership in such a club on account of race since 
1965. 
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CA4 affirmed. Relying on Hazelwood School District v. United 
states, 433 u.s. 299 (1977) and United Airlines v. Evans, 431 u.s. 
553 (1977), the panel majority reasoned that, like seniority 
differentials based upon hiring discrimination that occurred prior 
to the coverage of the Civil Rights Act, current salary 
differentials that were the lingering result of salary differences 
in practice prior to the coverage of public employers under the bar 
against discrimination in "terms and conditions" of employment were 
not in current violation of the Act. The panel engages in a lengthy 
critique of the statistical regression analysis presented by petrs 
and concludes that, under the analysis, the racial differentials 
could be the result of either differences in performance ratings or 
(as to pre-1965 hires) due to the salary differentials in effect 
prior to 1965. Since pre-existing differentials is a neutral reason 
for the current wage differences, the panel reasoned, the 
statistical analysis was flawed. The panel analyzed the performance 
ratings and concluded that blacks were rated in the upper three 
•quartiles• (qualifying them for raises) nearly as often as whites, 
eltminating the possibility of discrimination in performance 
ratinp. Tile panel tbue affiraed tbe ~ • fln41ng that petra had 
oo.e carzle4 their burden of provlnt intentional wage dlacrlaination. 
Ia to. tile county cbalraan poaitiou, U. 4 ~ that 
Mire-. on ceepoulble for De lu 
of aadt4at 
11111111••~•: of White app11oante rHOJIR I d won eo~•·••••; 
LWattn!• , or to the percentage of white appllaan 
lt.~Mn poeitiona generally, tbt pe e Glaf. 
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recommended for the chairman slot was nearly equal. Since the NCAES 
can not be charged with possibly discriminatory hiring decisions 
made by the third party county boards, the de correctly found on 
violation of title vrr. 
Pinally, CA4 upheld the de finding that support of single race 
4-H clubs was not in violation of title VI. There was no evidence 
that any black person had sought and been denied membership in an 
organization, and the mere existence of single race clubs does not 
violate the law. 
Judge Phillips dissented in part. Petrs' class should have 
been certified, as petrs were challenging service-wide employment 
practices. Rejection of the salary discrimination claims was error, 
as petrs were entitled to rely on race based salary differentials 
that existed at the time suit was filed in 1971 , even though the 
differentials were the result of previously legal salary 
discrimination. The Hazelwood-Evans principle does not apply to 
current salary discrimination, as opposed to seniority rights. ~he 
criticism of the statistical evidence, relied upon by the district 
court, did not establish that consideration of the additional 
-
factors would in fact affect the conclusion that the wage 
differentials were based on race. ~ihally, reiection of the claims 
based on segregation of 4-H clubs was also error, as both 
regulations under Jitle VI and the 14th !mendment itself both impose 
an affirmative duty to desegregate state supported programs that had 
previously been segregated by law. ~ "freedom of choice" plan does 
not satisfy that affirmative duty to desegregate. Green v. County 
_s_c_h_oo_l____;;B:.....;;o...;::a;.::..r..::.d , 3 91 u . s • 4 3 0 ( 19 6 8 ) • ~ v cl! ~~ 
+ t &.4M.. T£u. LA"/ 1<. h pte--ft 1i ~ 41 f ~ 
(>~I ( h r-; cl{ tC ~t) 1- J. ( ~c..-<4-
~~, ( /A tt.1. Y' t1 l-.U i 'ar. ~ 
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A petition for rehearing en bane was denied by an equally 
divided court. 
CONTENTIONS AND DISCUSSION: 
Wage discrimination-
Private petrs contend that the CA9 and the de erred in two 
significant respects in rejecting their claims of wage 
discrimination. First, the holding that wage differentials 
resulting from the carry over effects of prior discrimination 
conflicts with decisions in several circuits ~olding that wage 
discrimination is a continuing violation, not subject to the 
Hazelwood-Evans principle. E . g., Lamphere v. Brown Universitv, 685 
F . 2d 743, 747 (CAl 1982); Clark v. Olinkraft, Inc . , 556 F . 2d )219, 
1222 (CAS 1977); Int'l Union of Electrical Workers v. ~estinghouse, 
631 F.2d 1094 (CA3 180); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56i 
F.2d 429, 437-38 (CADC 1976); ~orman v . ~issouri Pac . R . ~., 414 F.2d 
73, 84-85 (r.A8 1969) (Justice Blackmun, as r.ircuit Judge) . Petr 
argues that the current wage differentials are the result not only 
of pre-1965 hires having smaller salaries upon which raises were 
based , but the continuing ~pplication of discriminatory "wage 
scales" adopted prior to 1965, even tn those hired since 1965. Each 
application of such discriminatory scales constitutes a new 
violation of the Civil Rights Act . 
Petrs second ground for challenging the ~p's rejection of its 
wage discrimination claims is based upon the ~c's treatment of their 
statistical ~vi~ence. Petr asserts that, under Oothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 u.s. 321 (1977) and ~~amsters v. United Stat~s, 4~\ 
u.s. 324 (1977), statistical proof of a disparity in treatment of 
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blacks may not be rebutted simply by suggesting other factors that 
the statistical survey might have considered. Such a criticisM of 
the statistical proof may be effective rebuttal only if accompanied 
by evidence that consideration of these other factors would in fact 
affect the conclusions of the study. The CA4 erred in treating mere 
speculation that other possible factors would affect the result as 
sufficient rebuttal, and this holding is in conflict with decisions 
in other circuits. E.g., Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d 1044, 1102 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 79 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1984): 
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79 (CA2 1980): 
Falcon v. General Telephone, 626 F.2d 369 (CAS 1980), rev'd on other 
grounds 457 u.s. 147 (1982). Since no statistical study could be 
sufficiently exhaustive not to be subject to some speculation that 
the addition of other factors would change the result, the eftect of 
the CA4 rule is to preclude proof of race discrimination through the 
use of statistical evidence. Thus, the CA4 decision eftectively 
nullifies Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 u.s. 424 (1971). 
The SG agrees that cert should be granted with respect to the 
issue of carry-over effects of pre-1965 wage discrimination. 
Correction of current pay differentials entails none of the 
retroactivity problems that the correction of the effects of past 
discrimination on current seniority status do. The SG concedes, 
however, that "this issue is a narrow one, and that this r.ourt's 
resolution of that issue will not obviate the need for further 
proceedings." The s~ does not recommend that cert be granted on the 
issue of the treatment of statistical evidence, since the SG 
believes that the CA4's approach to the statistical question was 
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appropriat~. According to the SG, a pl~intiff's statistical 
~vid~nce should be subject to rebutt~l based upon its failure to 
consider factors that would reasonably be expected to have an impact 
on the employment pattern challenged . 
Resps point out that th~re i.s no such thing as a N~AES "wag~ 
seal~," and that petrs' claims that current salary differentials are 
the result of the pre-Act imposition of a discriminatory "wage 
scale" is specious. tn fact , the compensation paid to each employee 
is the result of a complex matrix of factors , inclurling the level of 
county support, the special skills of each agent , job performance , 
and location. Essentially, the de made a factual finding , based 
upon petrs' statistical evidence in their case in chief and based 
upon rcsps ' rebuttal evidence , that no intentional discrimination 
had taken place. Petrs' factual dispute with the de findings does 
not rise to the level of a circuit conflict . Petrs' statistical 
analys~s were rebutted not by me~e speculation, hut hy proof that 
factors such as different county across-the-board and merit 
increases were not accounted for in petrs ' statistics. 
The r.A4 ' s ~pparent stateme n t that r.ace-hased wage differentials 
are not actionable if they are the " lingering effects" of purposeful 
discrimination in prior years is very troubling. The Evans case 
merely decided that a plaintiff could not revive a time-barred 
employment discrimination clai m by seeki nq seniority lost ~uring hPr 
lapae of. Pmployment duP to the violative employer policy. 
Similarly , Hazelwnod held mPrP l y that statistical 
undPrrcprcecntat1on r)F. mt nor t tiPS on a public schoo] faculty could 
not bP r~l fed upon to rPfl~ct emp l oyment diacrimlnation to the 
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extent that the underrepresentation was due to hiring practices in 
effect prior to the applicability of titl.e VII to public employers. 
Rere, plaintiffs appear to be demanding simply that they currently 
be paid the same wages that white NCAES employees with identical 
qualifications, positions, and seniority are paid. To the extent 
that CA4 held that such current wage discrimination is justified by 
historical wage discrimination against black employees of NCAES, its 
decision is nonsensical as well as in conflict wit~ cases cited by 
petr holding that wage discrimination is a continuing violation of 
title VII. 
This holding is anything but clearly presented by this case, 
however, since apart from petrs ' general statistical showing of wage 
disparities, there is only anecdotal comparison ot: like employees in 
like job positions in the same county. Comparison of white and 
black employees generally is muddled by the large differences in 
compensation from county to county. It is also unclear exactly how 
pre-1965 de iure wage discrimination resulted in continuing 
disparities--there was no evidence of a formal "wage scales" that 
remained in effect. The de examined each individual claim of wage 
-=--
discrimination separately and determined that no intentional wage 
discrimination had occurred. 
Despite the SG's less than enthusiastic cert petn, 1 am 
inclined to recommend a GRANT on the issue of whether wage 
discrimination resulting from an employer ' s failure to adjust 
individual black employees ' salaries upwards to bring such wages in 
line with prevailing white salaries is exempted from the !itle Vti 
-
requirement of equal terms and consitions of employment. Despite 
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the cloudy factual circumstances in which this issue is presenten, 
CA4's statistical analysis rests on the assumption that if the 
current wage differentials were due to a failure to start paying 
black employees the same wages as were paid to white employees in 
the same jobs, permanent, purposeful maintenance of such wage 
differentials would be legal. This holding is not required by 
Hazelwood and Evans, and creates a conflict in the circuits. 
The CA4's treatment of the statjstical evidence is probably not 
certworthy. Both ~eamsters and Dothard established that a title VII 
plaintiff may rely on statistica1 proof to establish a prima-facie 
case of discrimination and shift the burden of producing non-
discriminatory reasons for the disparity to the defendant. Texas 
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 u.s. 248 (1981). 
However, both the QC and the CA4 agreed that resps' evidence in 
rebuttal prevented petrs' from carrying their burden of proof as to 
the ultimate issue regardless of whether petrs' evidence in fact 
established a prima facie case. The de relied upon both resps' 
criticism of the validity and probative force of petrs' statistics 
as well as upon the factual circumstances of the parti.cular 
employees' claims of wage discrimination to conclude that petrs' had 
not carried their burden of establishing intentional race baseo wage 
discrimination. 
In Dothard, the majority opinion noted that, where the 
plaintiff has established a prima facie case via statistical 
evidence, "If the employer discerns fallacies or deficiencies in the 
data offered by the plaintiff, he is free to adduce countervailing 
evidence of his own." 433 u.s., at 331. Petr points to several 
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circuit court decisions that suggest that such statistical proof may 
be rebutted only by countervailing statistical evidence (Falcon; 
Trout), or by evidence specifically relating the factors not 
considered by the plaintiff's statistics to the wage disparities. 
Guardian's Ass'n, 630 F.2d at 88 n.7. According to t~e CA2 in 
Guardian's Ass'n, "to accept ... unsupported possibilities, a~d 
require the plaintiffs to refute every circumstance that could 
explain the disparate impact shown by the statistics, would create 
an onerous burden of proof, far in excess of the title VII standard 
as interpreted by the supreme Court." Id. 
Each of these decisions, however, involved review of a de 
conclusion that the plaintiff's statistics had in fact carried the 
burden of proof of discrimination. In each of these cases, the 
employer sought on appeal to establish that the plaintiff'~ 
statistics were insufficient as a matter of law to carry the burden 
of proof. The CAs in these cases were rejecting the notion that, as 
a matter of law, plaintiff's statistical proof must consider every 
conceivably relevant factor to be sufficient to support a judgment. 
I'm not sure that Teamsters, Dothard, or these circuit cases-- which 
hold that plaintiff's statistical proof is sufficient to support a 
judgment--necessarily suggest that plaintiff's statistical evidence 
requires a favorable judgment even where the factfinrler, after 
considering opposing expert testimony and anecdotal evidence, 
determines that no discrimination has taken place. 
In other words, none of these cases are inconsistent with the 
idea that it is up to the factfinder, in the first instance, to 
weigh the probative value of statistical evidence and determine 
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••• tile Plaintiff haa pr:oven hi a caae, or: ... n eata&t1.1..,.. a 
..,... laoie o•••· The de tn thta o••• ••PI'••••4 it• "oa&tta tha~ II.W 
•'-tiet£Oa •••n auppor:t a Pl'iaa facie ca•e, 9iven tbelr fallace te 
ooaalfar certain var!ablea. Pet. app. at 149a n.43. 
tarking ln tbla o .. • •ifht be the lntereattng queatlon wbetber, 
owce a plaintiff .. tab.liah•• a prl .. faa!• o ... by u.e at 
etatlattca, tile ~!e~t ._ ef!Mtt•e1r 1eb.ot tbe p1alntiff'• 
olahl aole!y ._ oclt'tetsl-. the ••Jidit~ of tblr •utiatto•. Cf. 
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Building Contractors did. The CA4 decision conflicts with Norris, 
since that decision held that the fact that the state delegated its 
employee benefits program to an insurance company did not absolve 
the state of liability under title "!I for the insurance company's 
discriminatory benefit provisions. 
The SG disagrees, and recommends that cert be denie~ on the 
County Chairman issue. NCAF.S is responsible only for its own 
employment decisions, and not those of third parties. Norris, in 
which the employer chose to offer only sexually discriminatory 
benefit plans, is inapposite. Here, the county, not Nr.AES, maoe the 
employment decision. 
Resps argue that since this is a ~itle VII disparate treatment 
case, which requires proof of intentional discrimination, General 
Contractors cannot be distinguished on the grounds suggested by 
petrs. In any case, there has been no delegation of the employment 
decision, since NCAES has never had sole authority to ma~e the 
appointment of County Chairmen- -this authority ha~ always been 
wielded by the county board , whtch has final. say. The de examined 
the facts of each applicant for county chairman positions 
separately , and concluded in each case that there had been no 
intentional racial discrimination by either NCAES or the county 
board of commissioners. 
I dont think that this issue is certworthy. NCAES shared 
appointment responsibility with the county boards, and, unlike the 
employer in Norris who could choose to offer a different insurance 
plan , NCAES apparently had no control over the actions or role of 
the county boards of commissioners. 
- 16 -
•-a Clab clat.a-
Private petrs claia tbat the ~·s finding that the support of 
.olantarily all-vbite 4-R clubs is in conflict vitb this Oourt•s 
decision in Green v. School Board. 391 u.s. 430 (1968) . vbicb beld 
that a •freeaa. of cboice• plan was not a sufficient desegregation 
relledy to offset prior de jt.~re scbool segregation. In tbis case. 
D.O.A. regulations pra.algated after Green require ezteDSiOD aid 
recipients to take affir.ative steps to r..edy pcevloua de jure 
segregation in such federally funded progra.s. ~e •free~ of 
choice• plan in this case bas .anifestly failed. and just as such a 
plan vas fOUDd deficient in Greea. so aast it be COftSlderecJ 
def icitmt in this case. 
ftae SG opposes the grant of cert OD tbia 1-. lftle SG 
.. tnQlaa tlaat tbe Green case. decided in tbe coateat of -.regated 
MDCia~ public ecltools. bas no application t:o a -.olQJltu~ 
• oqut•tt• eacla as the 4-11 club. Mapa maphasl• tUt ..,_ 
tetJtJ.ftecl thai: be • abe bacJ been eac1Qfle4t frca a 4-11 • Bneaeloa 
-••J:r•• clab oa the basts of race. ua tba~ au ecU•ltl• abGft 
•••~ leal wre ooaaacted oa a l~atel ._, •• 
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nq~inst peLscns on the or0unrl of race ... the rec\pient must take 
affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimination." 
rn Green, the court held that a freedom of choice plan that proved 
ineffective to remedy prior ~e jure ~egreqntion wa~ not 
constitutionally sufficient. I'm not sure that such a p 1 an ought to 
be considered sufficient to ~atisfy a regulatory duty to 
deseqregute, but given the SG's apparent lack of interest in 
enforcing the DOA regulation, l douht that the rourt w~ll be 
interested in this issue. 
Class Certification-
Petr contends that the de's refusal to certify the class and 
the CA4's affirmance violate this Court's decision in Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 u.s. 156 (1974). EiRen held that a court 
may not conduct an inquiry into the likelihood of succesB on the 
merits preliminary to making its certification decision. Yet by 
prejudging the petrs' claims that employment decisions were 
centralized, the de did just that, and by resting its affirmance of 
the class certification issue on its determination that petrs' 
claims on the merits were properly rejected, the CA4 compounded the 
error. 
The SG recommends against a grant of cert on this issue, 
reasoning that in fact the petrs' can claim no prejudice oue to 
their lack of class certification, since all class proof and 
remedies were asserted by the u.s. Resps rely on General ~eleph ne 
~ v. Falcon, 457 u.s. 147 (1982) for the correctness of the de's 
refusal to certify: membership in the same race alone does not 
establish commonality of claims, and the de correctly found that 
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since employment determinations were made on the county level 
members of the putative class were not similarly situated. 
This issue does not merit cert. The ~c~s inquiry into the 
commonality of the putative class members ' claims was required by 
Rule 23, even if the question happened to parallel petrs ' 
substantive claim that employment decisions were centralized . Nor 
would class certification apparently have had any effect upon the 
conduct of this case. 
CONCLUSION: The CA4's apparent reliance on an assumption that 
prior wage discrimination against black employees is a valid excuse 
for continuing wage discrimination as a "lingering effect" of such 
prior discrimination is highly troubling, and conflicts with 
decisions in other circuits. I recommend a GRAN~ on this issue. 
The relationship between statistical evidence and the burden 
shifting rule of McDonnell-Douglas and Burdine has also provoked 
much discussion in the circuits, but I do not believe that CA4's 
affirmance of the de's rejection of such statistical evidence as 
factually insufficient conflicts with Teamsters, Dothard, or any of 
the circuit decisions cited by petrs, all of which affirmed a de's 
acceptance of statistical proof as legally sufficient. Given the 
SG's lack of interest in enforcing the DOA regulation requiring 
desegregation of 4-H clubs, I do not think that the sufficiency of 
the freedom of choice plan is certworthy. Finally, neither the 
NCAES's responsibility for discriminatory appointments of county 
chairmen by county boards of commissioners, nor the appropriateness 
of class certification issues warrant review by this Court. 
There is a response. 
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October 30, 1985 Coplan Opn in petn 
